MANETs (Mobile Ad-hoc Networks) is a temporal network, which is managed by autonomous nodes, which have the ability to communicate with each other without having fixed network infrastructure or any central base station. Due to some reasons such as dynamic changes of the network topology, trusting the nodes to each other, lack of fixed substructure for the analysis of nodes' behaviors and loss of specific offensive lines, this type of networks is not supportive against malicious nodes' attacks. One of these attacks is black hole attack. In this attack, the malicious nodes absorb data packets and destroy them. Thus, it is essential to present an algorithm against the black hole attacks. This paper proposed a new approach, which improvement the security of DSR routing protocol to encounter the black hole attacks. This schema tries to identify malicious nodes according to nodes' behaviors in a MANETs and isolate them from routing. The proposed protocol, called AIS-DSR (Artificial Immune System DSR) employ AIS (Artificial Immune System) to defend against black hole attacks. AIS-DSR is evaluated through extensive simulations in the ns-2 environment. The results show that AIS-DSR outperforms other existing solutions in terms of throughput, end-to-end delay, packets loss ratio and packets drop ratio.
hop counts, the given node is labeled as suspicious in the table and its information is broadcasted to the neighboring nodes , that node is eliminated from operation cycle (Fig. 3 ). The black hole attack should enter to broadcast group to be able to separate the packs from the multicast. This kind of attack deletes some or the entire recipient packs instead of sending them and consequently it makes the result of packet delivery rate low. Black hole attack is divided into two groups: single black hole attack is applied via one of the existence nodes in the network and total black hole attack that corporates together for an attack more than one node [4] . The node, which executes the black hole attack, waits to receive a RREQ. With the receipt of this RREQ, the invader node without regarding its routing list or even considering any path to the destination, answers positively to that recipient RREQ and makes sending this RREP shorter than other nodes. The invader node cheats the node, which sends the RREQ by putting the most number of sequences and the least number of hops in the RREP. The node which sends the RREQ supposes that it has found the best path when receiving this RREP. Therefore, this node is considered as a short and fit path to send the packet. Because of that a black hole is created and each node-which is known as a black hole instead of sending the packets to destination gets their data or throws them away. The attack node does not check its routing list, so it answers to the RREQ node before the other nodes. If the attack node introduces itself as a fit path for the total network nodes and succeed to gain all network traffic, so it can destroy all network paths and prepare a DOS attack [5] (Fig. 4 ). 
THE ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEM
In general, the artificial immune systems (AIS) [1 and 6] are categorized on inspired algorithms from the biology. As the name would imply, these kinds of algorithms are computer based algorithms which their features and principles are the result of close examination in both adaptive characteristics 3 and the resistance of biological samples4. Samples of such algorithms are brain-inspired neurotic networks, as well as artificial immune system, which make use of principles and natural immune system processes to solve problems.
Immunity
In this section, the immune principles would be insinuated in such a way that will facilitate understanding the rest of paper and we avoid giving excess details. This section is beginning with a short summery about intrinsic immune system. The intrinsic immune system has not been used extensively in artificial systems, however, due to assisting the performance of acquisitive immune system and affecting it and the usage of it in this paper, having a short review regarding that seems necessary.
Intrinsic immunity
As the name would suggest, the intrinsic immune system would last not change over time and been adjusted for detecting a small number of common aggressors. The intrinsic immune system will diminish most of pathogens (which are the potential detrimental aggressors) at its first clash. The acquisitive immune system is in desperate needs of time to response against aggressors, so it is the intrinsic immune system responsibility to react against the aggressors immediately and bring the attack under its control so as to the acquisitive immune system could give an influential response [1] .
The acqustive immunity
When the intrinsic immunity is made active, its activity would last for several days while the time the acquisitive immunity is active, it would even endure for weeks. The acquisitive immunity is obliged to destroy the pathogens in case the intrinsic immunity has been defeated or is infeasible anyway. Inapplicability of the intrinsic immunity is due to its incapability to build a specific response for an aggressor pathogen; in this point, it is the acquisitive immune system, which takes the field. Unlike the intrinsic immunity, the acquisitive immunity is specific and has memory, according to Fig. 5 , it can remember the pathogen which has attacked one time and system generated a response for it, therefore in future encounters it can respond quickly to oppose it. 
B-cell, antibody and immunoglobulin
Like all immune cells, B cells are developed in bone marrow. A natural B cell contains 105 antibodies (receptor) on its surface. Each one of these antibodies has a unique shape that can be found in genetic structure of B cell and as a result they have a shape similar to B cell. Therefore all antibodies produced through a B cell are connected to a similar set of molecular models. According to figure 4, antibodies of B cell are dual-value and dual-performance. They are dual-value because of their capability for connecting to two antigens through two arms in Fab areas, and they are called dual-performance due to the fact that besides having the capability for connecting to antigen models using Fab areas, they can also be connected to certain receptors on surface of other immune cells using Fc portion [2 and 7]. 
RELATED WORKS
Computer networks are threatened by many security attacks such as modification, denial of service attack, fabrication attack, IP spoofing, etc. Therefore, a lot of research has been done in this regard [9-15].
Rutvij et al. [16] proposed a technique which makes use of AODV protocol to detect Black Hole attack. In this work, a dynamic node calculates a peak value for every time interval. The peak value calculates RREP sequence number, routing table sequence number and number of replies received during a particular time interval. These values are calculated for every time interval and in this way the attacks are calculated dynamically. According to their algorithm when an intermediate node receives RREP packets having higher sequence number than the peak value that node are marked as malicious node. Further the other nodes in the routing path get the details about malicious node information and isolate that vulnerable node from the network. Su [20] extended several intrusion detection system nodes in MANETs in order to detect and prevent selective black hole attacks. A selective black hole is a node which may optionally and alternately do a black hole attack or act as a normal node. The IDS nodes are set in sniff mode in order to estimate the suspicious values of nodes according to the abnormal difference between the routing messages transmitted from the nodes. In case of exceeding threshold, a near IDS asks all nodes on the network to cooperatively isolate the malicious node. The value of the threshold plays an important role in this study. In the proposed method, nodes monitor their neighbourhood and collaborate with their nearest neighbours to return the network back to its normal operational condition. The authors applied their scheme for the black hole and selective forwarding attacks.
In [21] , to overcome the black hole attack, authors proposed to ignore the first RREP packet reaching the source node. They implemented this solution by implementing RREP packet caching mechanism. A clusterbased scheme to prevent black hole attacks in MANETs was presented in [22] , which elects cluster heads to prevent black hole attacks. Then the authors proposed a cluster-based countermeasure to prevent the black hole attacks by identifying those black hole nodes. In another clustering black hole attack detection and prevention approach, each member of a cluster ping the cluster head to detect the peculiar difference between the numbers of data packets received and forwarded by the node. If anomalousness is detected, all the nodes will delete the malicious nodes from the network [23].
Araghi et al.
[24] provided a solution to prevent the black hole attack. In this study the basic authentication of intermediate nodes that send the path response message but get the confirmation from the destination was reviewed. If the confirmation is not received from the destination, these malicious intermediate nodes will be saved for arbitration at a later time. CL parameter is a counter that shows the miss behaviour of intermediate nodes when they send a wrong path response. If CL becomes more than 3 for each node, that node is considred as malicious and the path introduced by this node is avoided.
In [25] , an efficient approach for detection and removal of single and cooperative black hole attacks in MANET was presented. The algorithm not only detects the black hole nodes in case when the node is not idle but it can also detect the black hole nodes in case when a node is idle as well. To check if a node is idle, the authors used a threshold for the Interval. In case of exceeding the threshold, the malicious procedure is invoked. For this, a source node looks at its route cache, then sends RREQ packets, and waits for the replies.
Based on the replies, the black hole detection procedure is called. In this method, RREQ packets are sent in Fibonacci series pattern until the Flow count Threshold (which is set to 34 ms) is not reached.
Madadian et al. [26]
proposed a method to detect black hole attacks. In this method, when a node sends the path response package, a consultation process takes place around that node. Then, according to the comments by neighbor nodes, a decision is made about the maliciousness of the responsive node. One method to detect the black hole attack using a timer was presented. 
THE PROPOSED APPROACH (AIS-DSR)
In this section, we design a black hole-immune routing protocol by jointly employing the artificial immune system.
Proposed AIS-based Defense scheme against black hole attack
In order to make computer networks intelligent, we can make use of existing knowledge in the nature. One of these systems is the artificial immune system inspired by the human's immune system mechanism, which is an effective solution for convoluted predicaments in computer networks, such as in misbehavior detection or various attacks. In DSR routing protocol, once the first RREP is received by the source node, the packets will be transmitted to the destination node. This shortest route path approach, disregards route's security. In this paper, we do not send immediately packets toward the destination node, upon the first RREP reception.
Rather, source node considers entire received PREPs and then selects the most secure route by using the artificial immune system. General concept of this process is like a human being immune system, where antibodies are trained to detect and eliminate malicious antigens. To this end, the proposed approach develops and updates a set of conditions that could detect the routes infected by black hole attackers and abstain from selecting them. As shown in Fig. 8 , the proposed scheme has different steps. In the steps, as discussed in section Step 1, the AIS is used to select immune routes. 
Step 1: Initialization
In this step, for each route that received RREP would be examined in terms of security. For this purpose, a test packet will be sent over each route and the destination node should send a confirmation packet.
Obviously, if a route has a malicious node, the test packet would not reach to the destination and therefore confirmation packet would not be received. In this case, the probability of being a malicious node in the route will increased. The test packet will be sent three times to increase accuracy of the initialization step.
Step 2: AIS-base detection
As mentioned, the black hole attack shows hop count much lower than actual amount; so, in the case of having smaller hop count by a route, the probability of infection of this route would be increased. In similar manner, a route that has been infected by black hole attacker. Therefore, the desirable route is a route, which based on Equation (1), maximizes Fr indicator. In order to combine results obtained from Step 1 and Step 2, considering metric security and effic iency, general an indicator of route selection obtains from following Equation (2).
Definition 1 ( ℎ ( )) In this paper, a variable, termed as the route infection probability, is used to detect malicious nodes.
Algorithm (1), shows training of detectors in which it is teaching a set of antibodies in order to be resistant with a set of self-antigens for the purpose of being supported to defend against non-self-antigen (black hole attack). 8: The number of clones for an antibody is proportional to its affinity 9: Mutate attributes of these clones to the set A , and place a copy of the highest affinity antibodies in A into the memory set, M 11: Replace the n lowest affinity antibodies in A with new randomly generated antibodies 12: End
13: End
According to Algorithm 2. For every route. Algorithm 2 are calculated and that route is selected as the most immune route, which has a bigger number meaning Hop and Iteretauion.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this part, we evaluate the performance of the proposed approach (AIS-DSR) in the problem of prevention black hole attack.
approach (AIS-DSR) in the problem of prevention black hole attack
A. Performance metrics
We conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the effectiveness and performance of our AIS-DSR approach and compare it with DSR under black hole attack [32, 33 and 34]. We evaluate the throughput, end-to-end delay, packets loss ratio and packets drop ratio.
Throughput
Throughput is the number of data packets delivered from source to destination per unit of time.
Throughput is calculated as received throughput in bit per second at the traffic destination. The throughput is calculated in Equation (1) 
End to end delay
This is the average delay between the sending of packets by the source and its receipt by the receiver. This includes all possible delays caused during data acquisition, route discovery, queuing, processing at intermediate nodes, retransmission delays at the MAC, propagation time, etc. It is measured in milliseconds.
The lower value of end-to-end delay means the better performance of the protocol. The end-to-end delay is calculated in Equation (2) follows: [37, 38 and 39].
Packet lost rate
Packet loss occurs when one or more packets of data traveling across a computer network fail to reach their destination. Packet loss is typically caused by network congestion. Packet loss is measured as a percentage of packets lost with respect to packets sent. The lower value of the packet loss means the better performance of the protocol. The PLR is calculated in Equation (3) 
B. Simulation results and analysis
We have implemented AIS-DSR approached in the NS-2 on Fedora 10. The simulation parameters are given in Table I . low end-to-end delay can identify the destructive nodes and aware another nodes, but DSR protocols are disable because it has more end-to-end delay. Fig. 10 . End to end delay vs. pause time DSR protocol has lost more packets than a AIS-DSR approach and it shows the success of destructive nodes in operating the attack of black hole on this protocol. In general, because of rules and computation of the proposed method for identifying the destructive nodes, the loss of packet rate in the proposed algorithm decreases compared to DSR protocol (Fig. 10) . 
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an approach for detecting black hole nodes in MANETs based on the artificial immune system. First, the artificial immune system was employed to develop a learning approach to detect and bypass the black hole attackers without affecting the overall performance of the MANETs. The aim of the proposed algorithm in this paper is that we can identify the isolate node and delete them from routing in accordance to the behavior of nodes in the system.
We compared the efficiency of our defensive scheme i.e. AIS-DSR with DSR under black hole attack.
Simulation results showed that, in average, the overall performance of AIS-DSR is around 20% better than DSR routing protocol in terms of throughput, end to end delay, packet drop ratio and lost packets. In general, we can say that the proposed algorithm has better operation against malicious nodes than the DSR protocol.
In our future work, we plan to devise a mechanism to secure MANETs against the third attack model and test it intensively under different network conditions.
